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Surface-level differences in the reward and punishment variants, specifically greater long-
term decision making in the punishment variant of the Iowa GamblingTask (IGT) observed
in previous studies led to the present comparison of long-term decision making in the
two IGT variants (n=320, male=160). It was contended that risk aversion triggered by a
positive frame of the reward variant and risk seeking triggered by a negative frame of the
punishment variant appears as long-term decision making in the two IGT variants. Apart
from the frame of the variant as a within-subjects factor (variant type: reward and pun-
ishment), the order in which the frame was triggered (order type: reward–punishment or
punishment–reward), and the four types of instructions that delineated motivation toward
reward from that of punishment (reward, punishment, reward and punishment, and no-
hint) were hypothesized to have an effect on foresighted decision making in the IGT. As
expected, long-term decision making differed across the two IGT variants suggesting that
the frame of the variant has an effect on long-term decision making in the IGT (p<0.001).
The order in which a variant was presented, and the type of the instructions that were
used both had an effect on long-term decision making in the two IGT variants (p<0.05).
A post hoc test suggested that the instructions that differentiated between reward and
punishment resulted in greater foresight than the commonly used IGT instructions that fail
to distinguish between reward and punishment. As observed in previous studies, there
were more number of participants (60%) who showed greater foresight in the punishment
variant than in the reward variant (p<0.001). The results suggest that foresight in IGT
decision making is sensitive to reward and punishment frame in an asymmetric manner,
an observation that is aligned with the behavioral decision making framework. Benefits of
integrating findings from behavioral studies in decision neuroscience are discussed, and a
need to investigate cultural differences in the IGT studies is pointed out.
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INTRODUCTION
The somatic marker hypothesis (SMH) states that emotions are
indispensible to long-term decision making (Damasio, 1994). Sup-
port for the hypothesis comes from observing healthy participants’
ability to make long-term advantageous decisions on a task called
the Iowa gambling task (IGT; Bechara et al., 1994). In order to rule
out reward and punishment sensitivity as an alternative expla-
nation for decision making on the task, Bechara et al. (2000b)
compared reward and punishment variants of the IGT to demon-
strate long-term advantageous decision making irrespective of the
immediate reward and punishment frame of the IGT. However,
in the most examined reward variant, the magnitude (Tomb et al.,
2002; van den Bos et al., 2006) and frequency of immediate reward
and punishment (Chiu and Lin, 2007; Lin et al., 2007; Chiu et al.,
2008) continue to confound long-term decision making in the IGT.
In the current paper, the effect of reward and punishment
sensitivity on long-term decision making in the two variants is
examined. Three observations have led to the current examination
of the two variants. (1) In the original and subsequent studies,
there are on-the-surface differences in long-term decision mak-
ing in the two variants, such that higher long-term advantageous
decision making is seen in the punishment variant (e.g., Bechara
et al., 2000b, 2002; Must et al., 2006, 2007; Verdejo-Garcia et al.,
2006). (2) Differences in long-term decision making in the two
variants might be masked by using an unequal criterion for judg-
ing impairment in the two variants (i.e., a score less than 10 in
the reward variant and less than 8 in the punishment variant;
Bechara et al., 2002). Unequal cut-off criteria suggest a difference
in the ability to make long-term advantageous decisions in the
two variants. (3) Judging by the direction of inequality in the cut-
off scores, long-term decision making in the punishment variant
seems more difficult. However, more number of healthy partic-
ipants were “impaired” in the reward variant and “unimpaired”
in the punishment variant (56%), whereas only a small number
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of participants (4.5%) showed the opposite trend (Bechara et al.,
2002), suggesting greater difficulty in making long-term decision
making in the reward variant.
A difference in long-term decision making in the two variants
is expected based on the following extrapolation:
(1) Even though both the variants contain rewards and punish-
ments the reward variant triggers a positive frame and the
punishment variant triggers a negative frame. A brief descrip-
tion of the two variants will be helpful in understanding how
the immediate “frame” of the variant might affect long-term
decision making on the IGT. The reward variant offers a choice
between four decks of cards labeled A′, B′, C′, and D′. The par-
ticipant has to pick one card at a time; after a card is picked, an
announcement of the amount “won” is flashed on the com-
puter screen, occasionally followed by an announcement of a
“loss.” The punishment variant offers a choice between four
decks of cards labeled E′, F′, G′, and H′. After a card is picked,
the “loss” is announced, which at times is followed by a “gain.”
Therefore in spite of both the variants offering both, rewards
and punishments, the prominent outcome in the reward vari-
ant is a “win,” and in the punishment variant a “loss,” which
underlies the assertion that a positive frame (i.e., “gain”) is
triggered in the reward variant and a negative frame (i.e.,
“loss”) is triggered in the punishment variant. Unknown to the
decision maker, decks A′ and B′ have high immediate rewards
and a net loss, while decks C′ and D′ have small immedi-
ate rewards and a net gain. Long-term advantageous decision
making is reflected in avoiding the risky decks (decks A′ and
B′) and seeking the safe decks (decks C′ and D′). In the punish-
ment variant, decks F′ and H′ give immediate low losses and a
low net gain, while decks E′ and G′ give immediate high losses
and a high net gain. Long-term advantageous decision mak-
ing is reflected in choosing high immediate punishment decks
(decks E′ and G′) and avoiding low-immediate-punishment
decks.
(2) The dominant behavioral response required for long-term
decision making in the positive frame of the reward variant
is avoidance of the risky decks (decks A′ and B′), and in the
negative frame of the punishment variant, seeking of the risky
decks or endurance of high immediate punishments (decks E′
and G′). It is possible that in the previous studies, risk aver-
sion triggered in the reward variant resulted in safe choices
(i.e., choice of decks C′ and D′) and risk taking triggered in the
punishment variant resulted in choice of risky high immediate
punishment (i.e., choice of decks E′ and G′), choice in both
the variants appearing as long-term advantageous decision
making. Therefore it is contended that long-term decision
making in the two variants might demonstrate a “framing”
effect (Tversky and Kahneman, 1981) rather than “foresight”
and its immunity to reward–punishment sensitivity (Bechara
et al., 1994).
The first step in testing the effects of reward and punishment
frame in the IGT decision making taken was to test the effect of
the variant type (i.e., reward and punishment frames of the IGT),
and address a methodological problem that was observed in the
previous studies, i.e., lack of a counter-balanced presentation of
the variants (e.g., Bechara et al., 2000b, 2002; Verdejo-Garcia et al.,
2006). The effect of the order in which the variant is presented
would further indicate a “framing” effect suggesting that the order
in which a frame is triggered also has an impact on foresighted
decision making in the IGT.
To attribute the effect of variant type and order type to reward
and punishment sensitivity, task motivation toward reward and
punishment was altered via task instructions. Commonly used
instructions for both the variants (henceforth standard instruc-
tions) are bi-directional (i.e., the decision maker is asked to
seek rewards as well as avoid punishments; Bechara et al., 1994)
and trigger sensitivity to both reward (gain), and punishment
(loss). The standard instructions assume that long-term decision
making is indifferent to reward and punishment (i.e., the deci-
sion maker is equally motivated to seek rewards and to avoid
punishments). However, the standard instructions are known to
convey risk-avoiding clues on which long-term decision mak-
ing in the reward variant was dependent (Blair and Cipolotti,
2000; Balodis et al., 2006; Fernie and Tunney, 2006). It is pos-
sible that the only part of the standard instructions that directs
one to avoid punishment is attended in the reward variant which
would be compatible with the framing effect explanation. The
uni-directional instructions (i.e., the decision maker is motivated
either to seek rewards or to avoid punishments) will delineate
sensitivity to rewards from that of punishment, and the effect
of instruction alteration on long-term decision making in the
two variants will indicate a pronounced framing effect or the
effect of reward and punishment. In line with the assertion that
reward and punishment sensitivity has an effect on IGT decision
making, it was hypothesized that variant, order, and instruction
types will have an effect on long-term decision making in the
IGT.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
SAMPLE
Three-hundred twenty healthy undergraduate and graduate stu-
dents volunteered for the study (mean age= 23.82; SD= 3.25
years; male= 160). All the participants had more than 18 years
of education (22.7% were enrolled in a bachelor’s program, 44.9%
were enrolled in a master’s program, and 32.4% were enrolled in a
doctoral program). Most of the participants were right handed
(86.1%) and non-smokers (93.6%). All the participants were
medication-free, had never experienced a head injury that required
hospitalization, and had never been diagnosed with a psychiatric
illness.
DESIGN
A 2 (variant order: reward–punishment and punishment–
reward)× 2 (variant type: total net score on reward and total net
score on punishment variant)× 4 (instruction type: avoid punish-
ment, seek reward, standard, and no-hint) design was used in the
study. Within-subject variables were total net scores on the reward
variant and the punishment variant, and between subject variables
were type of order and type of task instruction used.
Decision making in the variants was analyzed according to the
“net score” method (Bechara et al., 1994), that is, the number of
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cards drawn from decks A′ and B′ are added and their sum is
deducted from the number of cards drawn from decks C′ and D′
[(decks C′+D′)− (decks A′+B′)]. This is done for a block of 20
trials each, and scores on 5 blocks are added to get a total net score
in the reward variant. In the punishment variant, the formula is
[(E′+G′]− (F′+H′)] for five blocks of trials added to get a total
net score.
MATERIALS
The computerized IGT progressive reward variant (A′B′C′D′) and
progressive punishment variant (E′F′G′H′) were used. The pro-
gressive variant is slightly different from the original IGT because
it exaggerates the future outcome, that is, it increases the mag-
nitude of long-term rewards in the advantageous decks and the
long-term punishments in the risky decks (Bechara et al., 2000b).
Four types of instructions were used with suitable changes to the
original (standard) IGT instructions (see Appendix).
PROCEDURE
Participants filled in demographic details in a form, were given an
overview of the experiment, and provided informed consent. The
study had the approval of a thesis committee (Research Progress
Committee), a departmental committee, and an institute-level
committee in charge of overseeing the post-graduate research pro-
gram at the institute. Participants were tested individually in a
laboratory and were assigned to one of the experimental con-
ditions. Two IGT variants were presented in a counter-balanced
design (i.e., reward variant followed by punishment variant or
vice versa) with one of the four types of instructions (see Figure 1).
Instructions were read before the first variant was presented. After
finishing the first variant, a small break was given (5 min), and
instructions were read for the second variant after which the
second variant was presented. After completing both variants, par-
ticipants were debriefed and thanked for their participation in the
study.
FIGURE 1 | Diagram showing variant type as a within-subjects factor
(R= reward variant and P=punishment variant), order type
(R–P= reward variant followed by punishment variant,
P–R=punishment variant followed by reward variant), and instruction
type (R= seek reward, P= avoid punishment, R and P= standard IGT
instruction to seek reward and avoid punishment, No-hint=no-hint of
reward or punishment) as between subjects factors (n=320).
RESULTS
A mixed between-within subjects analysis of variance (ANOVA)
was conducted to test the effects of order type (reward followed by
punishment or punishment followed by reward variants), instruc-
tion type (seek reward, avoid punishment, standard, and no-hint)
and IGT variant type (total net scores on reward and punishment
variants). There was a significant within-subjects effect of variant
type [Wilk’s lambda= 0.96, F(1, 312)= 14.66, p< 0.001, par-
tial eta squared= 0.04]. The interaction of order and variant
types was significant [Wilk’s lambda= 0.98, F(1, 312)= 3.58,
p< 0.05, partial eta squared= 0.02; see Figure 2]. There was
a significant interaction between instruction type and variant
type [Wilk’s lambda= 0.97, F(3, 312)= 3.58, p< 0.05, partial eta
squared= 0.03; see Figure 3]. A Tukey’s honestly significant dif-
ference (HSD) post hoc test showed that the instructions to seek
reward had resulted in significantly higher IGT net scores com-
pared to the standard IGT instructions (p< 0.05). A two-tailed
binomial test showed that the number of participants making
more advantageous decisions in the punishment variant than in
the reward variant was greater irrespective of order or instruction
type (p< 0.001; see Table 1).
DISCUSSION
Contrary to SMH postulations (Bechara et al., 2002), foresighted
decision making varied across the reward and punishment vari-
ants of the IGT. An inability to make equally foresighted decisions
in the two variants indicate that IGT decision making is affected by
variant type (i.e., by the immediate reward or punishment frame of
a decision). The impression that normal healthy adults make fore-
sighted decisions irrespective of the variant type might be the effect
of the variant, which is risk aversion in the reward variant and risk
seeking in the punishment variant, masked by how the decision
making in the variants is analyzed and reported (i.e., by judging
impairment in the two variants using unequal cut-off scores). In
an earlier study, positive and negative frame introduced prior to
the reward variant of the IGT led to a frame-appropriate response
(i.e., positive frame resulting in risk aversion and negative frame
FIGURE 2 |Total net scores on the reward and the punishment variants
(within-subjects) with the order of task presentation (between
subjects). Error bars represent standard error.
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FIGURE 3 |Total net scores on the reward and the punishment variants
(within-subjects) and the type of instructions (between subjects). Error
bars represent standard error.
resulting in risk seeking) which was attributed to a spontaneous
or an automatic process (Franken et al., 2006).
Consistent with the framing effect explanation for long-term
decision making in the IGT, the order in which the variants were
presented had an effect on the long-term advantageous decision
making. It was difficult to examine on-the-surface differences
between the two variants from the results of the previous stud-
ies due to an absence of a counter-balanced presentation of the
two variants (e.g., Bechara et al., 2000b, 2002; Verdejo-Garcia
et al., 2006) or an absence of a comparable healthy control group
(Must et al., 2006, 2007). The present results point out a differ-
ence in long-term decision making in the reward and punishment
variants, ruling out methodological issues.
The results showed that the alteration of reward and punish-
ment sensitivity via task instruction had an effect on long-term
decision making in the two variants. Uni-directional instruc-
tions (i.e., those that differentiated between reward and pun-
ishment) resulted in greater long-term decision making com-
pared to the bi-directional standard instructions (i.e., those that
had an indifference toward reward and punishment). This result
might explain why standard instructions in the reward variant are
known to encourage risk/loss avoidance more than they encour-
age reward-seeking (Balodis et al., 2006). It is possible that due
to a positive frame imposed by the reward variant only the part
of the standard instructions that directs the decision maker to
avoid punishments is attended in the reward variant. In line with
this assertion, it was found that delineating between the positive
and negative frames of the standard instructions resulted in higher
long-term decision making than the standard instructions that fail
to differentiate between reward and punishment (Krawitz et al.,
2010). In speculation, the right hemispheric dominance observed
in the reward variant of the IGT (e.g., Bechara et al., 2000a; Manes
et al., 2002; Clark et al., 2003; Bolla et al., 2004; Bark et al., 2005)
might be indicative of a sensitivity to punishment and risk aversion
because the right hemisphere is sensitive to negative affect (Sut-
ton and Davidson, 1997; Davidson, 2004) and associated with risk
aversion (Drake, 1985, 2002; Drake and Ulrich, 1992). Future stud-
ies could examine the right hemispheric dominance in the reward
variant to determine if it indicates risk aversion or loss aversion
and whether the punishment variant shows similar hemispheric
activity.
The on-the-surface difference of greater long-term advanta-
geous decision making in the punishment variant observed in the
original study (Bechara et al., 2002) had led to the present inves-
tigation. As suspected, the number of participants making more
long-term advantageous decisions in the punishment variant was
higher (more than 60%) than in the reward variant. The results
point out a difference in long-term decision making in the reward
and punishment variants, contradicting the claim that IGT deci-
sion making is immune to reward and punishment orientation
(Bechara et al., 1994, 2000b). The role of rewards and punish-
ments has been a contentious issue in IGT studies. For example,
contrary to the SMH-IGT assumption, the learning of rewards and
punishments (Rolls et al., 1994), knowledge of rewards and pun-
ishments (Maia and McClelland, 2004), immediate rewards and
punishments (van den Bos et al., 2006), and frequency of immedi-
ate rewards and punishments (Chiu and Lin, 2007; Lin et al., 2007;
Chiu et al., 2008) are believed to confound long-term decision
making in the reward variant of the IGT, weakening the assertion
that IGT decision making is immune to reward and punishment
sensitivity. The present results obtained from comparing both the
variants of the IGT suggest that reward and punishment has an
effect on long-term decision making in the IGT in the form of the
variant type (reward and punishment), order type (reward fol-
lowed by punishment and vice versa), and instruction type (either
approach reward or avoid punishment, and approach reward while
avoiding punishment).
There was evidence from the psychology literature that punish-
ment or negative stimuli is potent (Kanhouse and Hanson, 1972),
processed preferentially (Hansen and Hansen, 1988; Pratto and
John, 1991; Lane et al., 1997), produces a strengthened response on
the cognitive, emotional, and physiological levels (Taylor, 1991),
and results in a stronger motivation (Taylor, 1991; Cacioppo et al.,
1999) than reward or positive stimuli. It had been pointed out in
the behavioral decision making literature that reward–punishment
are unequally valued and have an asymmetrical influence (Tversky
and Kahneman, 1981, 1991). Incorporating other relevant findings
from behavioral studies such as temporal discounting, a pref-
erence for immediate reward over delayed ones (Ainslie, 1975),
myopic loss aversion, an over-sensitivity to losses combined with
shortsightedness (Benartzi and Thaler, 1995), preference based on
frequency of reward (Loewenstein and Prelec, 1992), and on pun-
ishment (Bateman et al., 2007), will add valuable insights to a
developing field of decision neuroscience.
The results underscore the role of socio-economic and cultural
factors in understanding decision making in the IGT. Inconsistent
with the IGT assumptions, frequencies of immediate reward and
punishment rather than the inter-temporal nature of choices were
determinants of IGT decision making in Taiwan (Chiu and Lin,
2007, Lin et al., 2007; Chiu et al., 2008), Iran (Ekhtiari et al., 2009),
and Brazil (Bakos et al., 2010). While it is assumed that risk is per-
ceived in terms of inter-temporality and risky decision making is
manifested in the tradeoff between an immediate versus a delayed
outcome (irrespective of reward or punishment as an outcome) in
the IGT, socio-economic, and cultural differences in the IGT sug-
gest an alternative definition of risk and risky decision making in
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Table 1 | Mean and standard deviations of total net scores in the two variants by order (n=160; male=80) and instruction types (n=40;
male=20).
Order type Instruction type Total net scores on reward variant Total net scores on punishment variant
Reward–punishment variant Seek reward −01.85 (27.08) 29.10 (32.05)
Avoid punishment 12.73 (27.09) 11.50 (36.44)
Standard IGT −07.35 (20.37) 03.20 (37.17)
No-hint −04.05 (24.43) 11.00 (23.70)
Total −00.13 (25.83) 13.70 (33.83)
Punishment–reward variant Seek reward 07.70 (33.76) 09.00 (37.61)
Avoid punishment 07.95 (26.22) 03.80 (21.65)
Standard IGT 02.20 (26.34) 06.15 (30.73)
No-hint −01.50 (19.77) 08.00 (19.60)
Total 04.09 (27.02) 06.74 (28.14)
the IGT. When socio-economic and cultural differences are investi-
gated as a part of the decision neuroscience studies, it would benefit
areas such as cultural neuroscience, and social neuroscience, by
helping us understand the link between culture-specific decision
making behavior and brain functioning.
The results pointed out a“negativity bias” in IGT decision mak-
ing. Is it easier to make long-term advantageous decisions when
the predominant outcome of every choice is a “loss”? Future inves-
tigations could examine the reason for the pronounced effect of
a loss frame that instigates risk taking than of a gain frame that
triggers risk aversion. In a task that is different from the IGT risk
aversion was observed to be detrimental to long-term advanta-
geous decision making (Shiv et al., 2005), whereas in the IGT
(reward variant), risk aversion is necessary for long-term advanta-
geous decision making (Balodis et al., 2006; Franken et al., 2006).
Until now, the two variants have never been compared to test risk
aversion in the reward variant and risk seeking in the punish-
ment variant. Future studies could compare the two variants to
test whether a pronounced effect of the punishment variant and
risk seeking is specific to a socio-economic and cultural context.
The methodology problem of counterbalancing the presentation
of variants that occurred in earlier studies was addressed in this
study, but the results need to be interpreted considering the limi-
tation that the participants did not play using real money, which
could be an important factor when comparing risk taking in the
reward and punishment variants of IGT.
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APPENDIX
Four types of instructions were used in the study: standard (1a
and 1b), seek reward (2), avoid punishment (3), and no-hint (4a
and 4b) instructions.
1a. Standard instructions, reward variant: “In front of you on the
screen, there are four decks of cards: A′, B′, C′, and D′. When
we begin the game, I want you to select one card at a time by
clicking on a card from any deck. Each time you select a card,
the computer will tell you that you won some money. I do not
know how much money you will win. You will find this out
as you go along. Every time you win, the green bar at the top
of the screen gets bigger. Every so often, when you click on a
card, the computer will tell you that you won some money as
usual, but it will also say that you lost some money as well. I
do not know when you will lose or by how much. You will find
out as you go along. Every time you lose, the green bar at the
top of the screen gets smaller. You are absolutely free to switch
from one deck to another at any time, and as often as you
wish. The goal of the game is to win as much money as possible
and to avoid losing as much money as possible. You would not
know when the game will end. Simply keep on playing until
the computer stops. You will have $2,000 of credit, shown by
the green bar, at the start of the game. The only hint I can give
you, which is the most important thing to note, is this: Out
of these four decks of cards, some are worse than others. To
win, you should try to stay away from bad decks. No matter
how much you find yourself losing, you can still win the game
if you avoid the bad decks. Moreover, the computer does not
change the position of the decks once the game begins. It does
not make you lose at random, or make you lose money based
on the last card you picked.”
1b. Standard instructions, punishment variant: “In front of you
on the screen, there are four decks of cards: E′, F′, G′, and H′.
When we begin the game, I want you to select one card at a
time by clicking on a card from any deck. Each time you select
a card, the computer will tell you that you lost some money.
I do not know how much money you will lose. You will find
this out as you go along. Every time you lose, the green bar
at the top of the screen gets smaller. Every so often, when you
click on a card, the computer will tell you that you lost some
money as usual, but it will say that you gained some money
as well. I do not know when you will gain or by how much.
You will find out as you go along. Every time you gain some
money, the green bar at the top of the screen gets bigger. You
are absolutely free to switch from one deck to the other at any
time, and as often as you wish. The goal of the game is to avoid
losing as much money as possible and to win as much money as
possible. You would not know when the game will end. Simply
keep on playing until the computer stops. You will have $2,000
of credit, shown by the green bar, at the start of the game. The
only hint I can give you, which is the most important thing
to note, is this: Out of these four decks of cards, some are
better than others. To win, you should try to choose from the
good decks. No matter how much you find yourself losing,
you can still win the game if you choose from the good decks.
Moreover, the computer does not change the position of the
decks once the game begins. It does not make you win or lose
at random, or make you win or lose money based on the last
card you picked.”
2. Seek reward instructions: Same as in the standard instructions,
reward variant, except that the bold text is now “The goal of
the game is to win as much money as possible.”
3. Avoid punishment instructions: Same as in the standard
instructions, punishment variant, except that the bold text
is now “The goal of the game is to avoid losing as much money
as possible.”
4a. No-hint instructions, reward variant: “In front of you on the
screen, there are four decks of cards: A′, B′, C′, and D′. When
we begin the game, I want you to select one card at a time
by clicking on a card from any of these decks. Sometimes you
will win points, and sometimes you will lose points. You are
absolutely free to switch from one deck to another at any time,
and as often as you wish. You would not know when the game
will end. Simply keep on playing until the computer stops.
You will have $2,000 of credit, shown by the green bar, at the
start of the game. Moreover, the computer does not change
the position of the decks once the game begins. It does not
make you lose at random, or make you lose money based on
the last card you picked.”
4b. No-hint instructions, punishment variant: “In front of you
on the screen, there are four decks of cards: E′, F′, G′, and
H′. When we begin the game, I want you to select one card
at a time by clicking on a card from any of these decks.
Sometimes you will win points and sometimes you will lose
points. You are absolutely free to switch from one deck to
the other at any time, and as often as you wish. You would
not know when the game will end. Simply keep on play-
ing until the computer stops. You will have $2,000 of credit,
shown by the green bar, at the start of the game. More-
over, the computer does not change the position of the decks
once the game begins. It does not make you lose at ran-
dom, or make you lose money based on the last card you
picked.”
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